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Time as Experience/Experience as
Temporality
Pragmatic and Perfectionist Reflections on Extemporaneous Creativity
Vincent Colapietro
 
Introduction: The Experience of Improvisation/The
Renovation of Experience
1 My  ultimate  goal1 is  to  sketch  the  broad  outlines  of  an  experiential  approach  to
extemporaneous creativity, especially as such creativity is exemplified by jazz musicians.
This approach is, at once, pragmatist and (in Stanley Cavell’s sense) perfectionist.2 But my
initial goal is to illuminate human creativity in its less manifest forms.
2 Paradoxically, such creativity is commonplace. The actions, gestures, and utterances of
human beings in everyday life are far from mindless routines. To some extent, they are
almost always creative responses to dramatic situations (cf. Joas 1996, Ch. 3). They are, at
the very least, unrehearsed responses, that is, improvised or extemporaneous ones. As R.
W. Emerson stresses in “Quotation and Originality,” they ineluctably draw upon past
exertions; they deeply draw upon interiorized traditions.3 But the nuanced spontaneity of
these extemporaneous exertions ordinarily transcends the mechanical re-enactment of
fixed habits. Even a frequently repeated expression, one reiterated innumerable times
such as “Hello” or “Good morning,” can be variously inflected and by the truly courteous
person is situationally modulated. The phrasing of such a person can arguably be as deft
as that of Frank Sinatra when shaping a musical phrase (Iseminger 2010: 299). Without
question, deeply sedimented habits make possible extemporaneous creativity, so much so
that it is easy to allow the operation of such habits to eclipse our appreciation or even
awareness  of  the  creativity  inherent  in  our  unrehearsed  exertions.  The  innate
intelligence of the human animal, precisely as a meshwork of dispositions, is, however, an
organ of novelty,  all  the more so human intelligence in its more mature form.4 Such
intelligence is as much as anything else a capacity to act creatively (Emerson; Whitehead).
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Present  action  is,  to  repeat,  not  simply  the  mechanical  re-enactment  of  established
dispositions; rather it tends to be an innovative manner of responding to the immanent
demands of an unfolding drama. The roots of it in the past should not obscure from us the
fruits just now forming themselves in the ever present spring of the living present (CP
5.459; also EP 2: 358). The spontaneity and plasticity of the child can be preserved by or,
to some extent, recovered by, the adult. As much as action reveals the presence of habits,
it can also alter the form of those habits, if only in subtle and virtually imperceptible
ways.  Habits owe not only their origin but also their continuance and integration to
actions.  Our  experience  of  improvisation  discloses  the  irreducible  reality  of
extemporaneity  but  also  the  inescapable  renovation  of  experience  itself.  We  are
continuously making something of our experience and, therein, re-making nothing less
than our selves. What is imperceptibly pervasive in our everyday doings, is dramatically
operative in jazz improvisation. In their most successful improvisations, jazz musicians
combine  the  spontaneity  of  the  novice  explorer  and  the  control  of  the  experienced 
practitioner. They draw upon wide and deep experience in order (as much as anything
else)  to  interrogate  what  their  experience  prompts  them  to  play.  Accordingly,  jazz
improvisation is a series of focused self-interrogations, a form of exploration in which
previously successful modes of exploration are themselves subjected to interrogation. It
aims at  “a cultivated naiveté of  eye,  ear,  and thought” (LW 1:  40);  put  otherwise,  it
culminates in deliberate spontaneity (spontaneity resulting from reflection). The original
spontaneity  of  the  very  young child  and the  irrepressible  extemporaneity  of  human
actors in the variable scenes of their quotidian engagements are in complex ways related
to the cultivated naiveté of the experienced improviser.
3 My goal here is, at the very least, to render this claim plausible. Because not only the
acquisition but also the interrogation of experience is so critical in such improvisation, the
realization of this goal requires me to embed this sketch in a thick account of human
experience.  For  this,  Stanley  Cavell  no  less  than the  classical  pragmatists  is  critical.
Accordingly,  the  path  to  the  topic  of  improvisation  cannot  avoid  being  somewhat
circuitous: it will weave its way through an extended discussion of philosophical appeals
to human experience. But the point of this discussion is to underscore the importance of
experience itself, not our efforts to articulate a theory of experience. That is, the appeal
to experience refers here to what a practitioner does in the context of some engagement;
in particular, it refers, in the first instance, to what everyday actors do in the ordinary
circumstances of their lives and, in the end, to what jazz musicians do in the context of
performance. As this suggests, I am guided by the intuition that musical improvisation is
not an utterly unique phenomenon; it is rather part of a vastly extended family of human
activity. Therefore, the main reason why I approach our topic in this manner is what
William Day suggests in a very instructive treatment of the elusive topic of jazz
improvisation: we properly orient ourselves to jazz improvisation (thus, to arguably the
most important form of  musical  creativity)  when we strive “to experience  improvised
music as a species of ordinary, unrehearsed activity” (2000: 102; emphasis added). The
experience  in  question  calls  for  understanding  how  it  relates  to  both  the  most
commonplace experiences and (to a less extent) other forms of human engagement (e.g.,
scientific investigation, moral deliberation, and religious worship). First and foremost,
however, we need to experience this form of musicking5 as a creative refinement of our
everyday  extemporaneity.  The  reconstruction  of  experience  advocated  by  the
pragmatists  and  the  approach exemplified  by  Cavell  are  undertaken for  the  sake  of
enhancing experience itself (Colapietro 2008: 118-19). That is, they are offered as ways of
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rendering our modes of engagement more luminous, intense, fulfilling, significant, and
sustainable than they otherwise would be (cf. LW 1: 305). They concern primarily direct
(or “immediate”) experience itself, not a formal understanding, certainly not a detached
understanding, much less an elaborate theory of it. While reading a text is, in this context,
one such mode of engagement,  so too are watching a film, conversing with a friend,
walking around a city, and hiking up a mountain. Their concern is with the quality of the
experience of reading, watching, walking, conversing, and climbing. In the end, solicitude
for  this  quality  encompasses  nothing  less  than  what  H. D. Thoreau  in  Wild  Fruits,  a
recently discovered manuscript, calls the “art of how to spend a day” (Thoreau 2001; cf.
Emerson’s “Art”). But we also need to articulate an understanding of experience that is
able to make sense of what experience actually is in our lives, not only in our formally
reflective  engagements  but  also  in  the  myriad  contexts  of  our  everyday  lives.
Philosophical theories of human experience have tended to be crude caricatures, not least
of all because they have occluded the most salient features of human experience when
experience is considered in reference to the actual achievements and inevitable failures
of  an  experienced  practitioner  (say,  an  experienced equestrian  or  an  experienced
musician).  Hence,  part of the task here is to bring into focus the features that other
accounts of experience tend to occlude.
4 The significance of our experience is far greater than the role played by experience in the
acquisition of knowledge.6 This role is tremendously important and, thus, needs to be
properly understood (cf. Haack 2009; also Short 2008). But the appeal to experience is not
limited to the differential perspective of the theoretical inquirer (Smith 1981); indeed, it
is present in every domain of human engagement. For example, the novice reader might
greatly benefit from an experienced one.7 The experience of novices is however not to be
slighted, certainly not to be denigrated.8 Regardless of the practice or site of engagement,
it all comes down to “experience personally conducted and personally consummated”
(MW 3: 94). But the dominant traditions of Western philosophy are, in effect, so many
betrayals of experience, most of all because they assume that, in order for us to comport
ourselves responsibly, we must have resources and criteria beyond anything experience
could provide. Experience is judged to be, even by Kant and Hegel, not sufficient unto
itself. Though Kant and indeed all of the rationalists concede that appeals to experience
are  in  some  instances  necessary,  they  are  far  from  sufficient:  a  transcendental  or
dialectical or some other form of reason alone can make up for the inherent deficiencies
of  our  finite  experience.  The  need  to  go  beyond  experience  indeed  seems  to  many
thinkers to be an exigency rooted in experience itself. But the classical pragmatists in
their way and Cavell in his suggest that the need is rather to turn toward experience in a
more painstaking, courageous, and imaginative manner than philosophers have yet done.
They do not presume that a trans-experiential reason is required; rather they contend
that  the  cultivated  capacities  of  the  human  animal  are  sufficient  for  drawing  from
experience what such an animal needs to act responsibly and, indeed, to live wisely. 
5 While  the  experience  of  time  as  experience,9 especially  as  it  is  exhibited  in  the
extemporaneous  creativity  of  jazz  musicians,  is  our  ultimate  concern,  the  appeal  to
experience is our inaugural topic. Though I will begin by framing this topic with the help
of the pragmatists and an exemplary expositor of the pragmatic tradition, I will turn
decisively to Cavell’s insistence upon the need for “checking one’s experience” (1981: 12;
cf. Day 2000: 100). That is, we need simultaneously to consult and interrogate our own
experience, to fall back upon it and to turn it upon itself. This experiential task is itself a
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prefiguration of extemporaneous creativity. Consequently, in exploring the contours of
this task, we will be foreshadowing the exploration of jazz improvisations as an arresting
instance of what a reflective engagement with human experience demands.
6 The characteristic focus of human agents is on the most immediately imminent future,
the future as it just now is taking shape in the present (see e.g. Peirce: EP 2, 358 and
James: MT, 231). Experience is, among other things, a name for what equips the human
animal to meet effectively the promptings, pressures, and propulsions of this intimately
imminent future (see, e.g., LW 10: 28; also Whitehead 1933 [1961], Ch. XI). The appeal to
experience in its  rudimentary form is  not a formal,  articulated appeal;  it  is  rather a
spontaneous,  situated  response,  for  when  agents  respond  in  this  manner  they  are
drawing upon (or going on10) their experience. Even so, the philosophical attempts to
accredit  the  appeal  to  experience,  especially  those  of  the  classical  pragmatists  and
Stanley Cavell, help us to understand what is entailed – and indeed entangled – in its most
rudimentary form.
 
The Appeal to Experience: Naïve and Critical
7 John E. Smith was fond of remarking that William James “wrote as though one had only to
consult ‘experience’ as one consults a timetable in order to find the answer” (Smith 1983:
40).11 This is no doubt a caricature. It is, indeed, an intentional one. But there is value in
caricaturing James in this manner.  For it  underscores the difficulties inherent in any
appeal to experience. Of course, James was alert to these difficulties and, moreover, Smith
was  appreciative  of  James’s  sensitivity  in  this  regard.  But  James’s  efforts  to  recover 
experience in a fuller and deeper way than had yet been done occasionally forced him to
simplify what is involved in any appeal to experience. A reliable timetable is, of course,
the  result  of  a  painstaking  distillation  of  controlled  observation.  As  such,  it  is  at  a
significant  distance  from  primary  experience  in  the  Deweyan  sense  (certainly  even
farther from “pure” experience in the Jamesian sense!). Such a symbolic chart is at once
the  reflective  distillation  from,  and a  valuable  instrument  for,  ascertaining  practical
opportunities concerning (say) railroad travel. In a sense, the experience of any mature
person is to some extent always already codified. Aye, there’s the rub, especially from a
Jamesian perspective. So, the appeal to one’s own experience is quite unlike that to a
timetable.
8 We need not only to appeal to experience but also to reflect on what is entailed when
practitioners do so, especially in the context of practice, that is, of performance. So, the
necessity  of  such  an  appeal  cannot  be  gainsaid,  at  least  by  those  of  us  who  take
experimental science seriously, also by those who consider personal experience uniquely
valuable. The very possibility of such an appeal is, however, deeply problematic. If human
experience is what traditional philosophy has claimed, it cannot bear the weight or fulfill
the functions placed upon it.  The recovery of experience must,  at least in part,  be a
reconstruction of our understanding of experience such that experience can bear, for
example, the weight of experimental evidence, as this expression is used by the scientific
inquirer, or that of personal testimony, as this is understood in a historical situation.
Even so, it cannot be merely a reconstruction of our understanding of experience, for it
must  be  both a  creative  appropriation and an ongoing transformation of  our  actual
experience (Colapietro 2008). In other words, it must be an enhancement of experience
itself,  an  enhancement  due  above  all  else  to  the  cumulative  effects  of  making  our
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experience, at once, more our own and more trust- worthy. The appeal to experience is
something we do; and that to which we appeal is, in some manner and measure, called
into being as the result of our appeals. Experience is, in its immediacy, so inchoate and
unfocused as not to be recognizable by us as experience (i.e., by us as experience) until
others have held us accountable and, as a result, we begin to hold ourselves responsible
(MW 14: 18, 216-17) for the conjunctions between what we do and what we suffer (or
simply  undergo).  This  however  should  not  be  interpreted  as  an  example  of  radical
constructivism; rather it should be seen as an implication of pragmatic intelligence. The
given is never simply given; put positively, it is always in some fashion taken (LW 1: Ch. 4;
LW 12: 127). Even in the most uncontrolled phases of our primary experience selective
attention is an ineliminable function (again, LW 1: 34). Selective attention is inevitably
woven into a fabric involving potentially debilitating inattention (Hagberg 2008: 260-61).
9 The appeal to experience is analogous (if only remotely analogous) to what is involved
when a competent speaker addresses a very young child who is barely more than an
infant in the etymological sense. The infant becomes a speaker by being addressed by
others  as  one  (as  someone  whose  babblings  are  already  to  some extent  utterances).
Analogously, experience becomes something to which we can reliably appeal by being
that to which appeals are made. Experience as a court of appeal is constituted as such by
the conscientious efforts of deliberative agents. In stressing this point, however, I do not
intend to privilege unduly the juridical  metaphor,  especially since my intention is to
move away from Kant, not to reinforce his authority. Other metaphors are indeed needed
to highlight other facets of experience. I might appeal to a friend for reassurance or to a
lover  for  affirmation  of  my  singularity.  The  appeal  to  experience  is,  in  any  event,
simultaneously an appeal to one’s own experience and to the experience of others. On
this occasion, however, I want to focus most of all on the deeply personal dimension of
human experience, without thereby neglecting the inevitably communal dimension. That
is, I want to focus primarily on what is entailed in an appeal to one’s own experience,
though I fully concede that your experience and mine are far from separable and, in
numerous cases, hardly distinguishable.
10 No point is more important to stress than this one: The appeal to experience can be either
naïve or critical (Smith 1967: 6-8). If naïve, it turns out, at some point, to be a betrayal of
experience. For the experienced person is anything but naïve. Indeed, such a person is,
virtually, by definition one who is resolutely disposed to be skeptical of naïve claims,
especially  when  such  claims  are  entwined  with  personal  pretention  or  simply
presumptuous attitudes. To repeat: if the appeal to experience is naïve, then anyone who
makes such an appeal is destined to be exposed, at some juncture, as someone entangled
in a betrayal of experience. The experienced person is, accordingly, a practical (not a
rhetorical or theoretical) skeptic, that is, a skeptic in the etymological rather than the
textbook sense. Above all else, then, the disposition not only to pose questions but also to
be open to questioning all facets of our questions themselves defines the skeptic in this
sense. Etymologically, the skeptic is the inquirer and, perforce, the questioner – one who
is alive to the force, implications, and salience of questions ordinarily left unasked. To
invoke an expression from Ludwig Wittgenstein (“Question the question”), however, it is
not enough simply to question; we must question our own questions. We must interrogate
the motives and ideals animating as well as the protocols and indeed spirit structuring
our forms of interrogation. Skeptical reflexivity of course returns, time and again, to the
interminable  task  of  reflexive  interrogation:  put  quite  simply,  the  task  of  calling
Time as Experience/Experience as Temporality
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, V-1 | 2013
5
ourselves into question. Part of the goal of this essay is, however, to suggest that self-
interrogation and self-trust are of a piece (Emerson; Day). For the moment, it suffices to
say that a critical stance toward one’s own experience paradoxically involves questioning
what one must, in some fashion, trust. The distrust implicit in the very act of questioning
turns out to be an expression of trust (or faith) in our experience as a self-corrective and
self-transcendent  process.  We cannot  help but  fall  back on our  own experience.  For
experience is not only that with which we have been entrusted;12 it is also that in which
we are forced to put our trust. It is, in the end (that is, in the meantime), what we willy-
nilly go on, especially in our efforts to go on (see, e.g., Wittgenstein PI, #179; Cavell 1990:
70).  As  it  presently  stands,  however,  it  is  not  yet  entirely  trustworthy.  Making  our
experience  trustworthy  can  only  begin, in  earnest,  by  entrusting  ourselves  to  our
experience (again, Day).  Trust is inevitably the first word, whereas trustworthiness is
ideally the “last” one (though there is no more a final or ultimate word than there is,
without ambiguity or uncertainty, an inaugural or initiating one).
11 If  our experience is critical rather than naïve, then another set of dangers inevitably
appears upon the stage of our thinking. These inevitable dangers are, for the most part,
disguised characters, some of them being indeed seductive figures whose alluring power
might have far more destructive sources than even these seducers realize. It is likely that
they have misled themselves. In other words, the forms of seduction almost certainly
involve, for the seducer no less than the seduced, a subjection to a series of illusions. For
example, Immanuel Kant in his Herculean effort to save human experience from Humean
“skepticism” has, in my judgment, betrayed experience at least as much as Hume. Those
who are seduced by his critique of reason, a project inescapably encompassing a critique
of experience, are, therefore, blocked from their own experience, in subtle, frequently
imperceptible, but ultimately destructive ways. But so too is Kant himself. As tempting as
it is to see either the pragmatic or the perfectionist appeal to human experience as a
transformation of the transcendental approach, it is better to resist than to succumb to
this temptation. Such, at least, is what I hope to show next.
 
The Critique of Experience: Transcendental or
Experiential?
12 For my own purpose, however, the principal point is that the form in which a critique of
our own experience is most humanely and wisely undertaken need not be the form in
which Kant cast his critiques of reason and, consequently, articulated his critical stance
toward  cognitive,  moral,  and  aesthetic experience.  A  critique  of  experience  is
unavoidable.  Naiveté is,  experientially,  precluded.  Experience is indeed the name for a
process of overcoming the myriad forms of human naiveté, both historically pervasive
ones  and  specifically  contemporary  Gestalten.  It  not  only  invites  but  also  demands
interrogation. Our experience proves itself trustworthy by being subjected to relentless
critique,  incessant interrogation,  innumerable queries As Marx,  Nietzsche,  Freud,  and
indeed others have stressed, such critique is always an exercise of courage. As it stands at
any actual  moment  of  either  our  personal  lives  or  collective  histories,  however,  our
experience is not entirely trustworthy, even in those instances (cf. Day 2000), or in those
contexts,  when  it has  undergone  dramatic  trans-  formation  as  a  result  of  our
conscientious critiques. It more often than not needs to be rendered more trustworthy.
Our  opposition  to  the  (allegedly)  Humean  dissolution  of  human  experience  into  an
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arbitrary  conjunction  of  sensory  impressions  need  not drive  us  to  a  transcendental
critique of human rationality, even though familiarity with the details of such a critique,
especially  as  developed  by  such  a  philosophical  genius  as  Kant,  can  be  immensely
suggestive for how other forms of critique (including ones breaking decisively with the
tenacious tradition of transcendental philosophy) are to be carried out. So, the critique of
experience is (to repeat) inescapable, whereas the form of that critique is debatable. On
this  occasion,  I  want  more  than  anything  else  to  suggest  that  this  form  might  be
something more deeply akin to the one we encounter in the writings of Stanley Cavell
than  the  form  we  see  exemplified  in  the  texts  of  Kant.  Of  course,  Cavell’s  critical
engagement with experience owes much to Kant’s transcendental critiques of rationality
in its distinguishable forms (Neiman). But it is not simply or even primarily a variant of
the form we encounter in Kant. For Cavell’s writings in this regard mark a decisive break,
a dramatic rupture, with the transcendental tradition, thereby opening a creative space
for a truly novel engagement with human experience. The motives and implications of
this engagement are as deeply in tune with our time as Kant’s were in sync with his epoch
or moment in history.
13 In any event, a critical stance to our precarious experience need not reenact the Kantian
turn. Our experience is precarious because we are typically careless but (of even greater
pertinence) we are, all too often, cowardly. To use a wonderful expression employed by
William Ernest Hocking, we have to have the courage of our experience.13 In falling to
have  this  courage,  we  in  effect  fail  to  have  nothing  less  than  the  experience  itself
(Colapietro  2008).  Put  otherwise,  the  coin  by  which  our  experience  is  purchased  is
courage: our experience is not ours lest there is, especially at critical junctures [crisis], a
courageous refusal to cede our personal experience to various authorities (Cavell 2005).
To be thr own back on our experience is, in effect, to be thrown back on self-trust. But
what makes this especially problematic and disconcerting is  that,  at  just  those times
when we are  thrown back on self-trust,  we  are  ordinarily  least  confident  about  the
trustworthiness of our experience. Practically, this means that we are least confident of
our mastery of an aspect of a practice especially relevant to the execution of a task, in the
here and now, frequently a task thrust upon us (not infrequently, an inescapable task). In
a word, we are least confident about ourselves. Do we possess what the moment demands
of us, what the situation asks so urgently of us? The felt “No” is no warrant for personal
annihilation, for self-abnegation; rather it is a reason for self-affirmation. Trust in the self
helps create the self. More fully, trust in the self helps create not only the self (hence, a
self worthy of being trusted) but also a depth of experience itself worthy of our trust. Of
course,  such a trustworthy self  and such trustworthy experience are not in the least
separable. In the end, they are identical.
14 The critique of experience might take the form of an experientially animated and guided
process  wherein  unblinking  attention  to  immanent  factors,  above  all,  immanent 
tendencies,  on  the  one  hand,  and  immanent  failures,  frustrations,  fulfillments,  and
facilitations, on the other, is the decisive factor (Hagberg 2008). In Pragmatism, William
James writes: “Nothing outside of the flux secures the issue of it. It can hope salvation
only from its own intrinsic promises and potencies” (1978: 125).
15 The critique of experience is, at bottom, rooted in our experience of crisis, where the
word  crisis  designates  (as  the  etymology  suggests)  not  necessarily  a  catastrophe  but
primarily  a  moment  of  decision  (though  the  decision  need  not  be  a  conscious  or
deliberate  one).  In  his  role  as  an  inquirer,  committed  to  the  ceaseless  advance  of
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theoretical knowledge, Kant experienced a crisis:  the Humean challenge needed to be
met, for otherwise Kant in this role could not go on (at least, could not go on in good
intellectual conscience). What we witness in Kant’s first Kritik is accordingly a response to
an existential crisis, not simply the solution of a philosophical puzzle. The experience of
crisis might also be exemplified by being challenged by a child as to why one proceeds in
a certain fashion, acts in a particular way. Wittgestein: “This is simply what I do.” The
question, time and again, turns out to be: How am I to go on (Wittgenstein, PI, #179)?
 
The Recovery of Self-Trust/The Rediscovery of the
Ordinary
16 Though I have already touched upon this theme, it is instructive to see the way in which
Cavell links experience and self-trust. We have no option but to trust our experience. But,
in doing so, we are eventually, perhaps quickly, led to the realization that experience is
not up to the demands we are placing upon it. At this point, we might turn aside from
experience and seek for resources from some other source. This move is predicated on
the  conviction  that  experience  is  inherently  and  invincibly  deficient  precisely  in
providing us with the means for (say) more responsibly conducting our inquiries, more
justly  arranging  our  institutions,  or  more  sensitively  shaping  our  responses  to  the
singular beings with whom our own singular lives are so intricately entangled. But we
might also turn back to experience in a self-consciously critical manner, animated by the
goal of transforming our experience into something more trustworthy than it now is
(Cavell 2005: 12). The present inadequacies of our experience are not, in themselves, a
sufficient warrant for jettisoning our trust in ex- perience. To rely uncritically upon our
present  experience  is  naïve;  however,  to  jettison  completely  that  experience  is  self-
stultifying,  indeed,  self-destructive.  Maturity,  inevitably  the  result  of  a  series  of
disillusionments, need not eradicate all trust in either the self or the world as a source of
warrants and as a site of fulfillments (the self-in-the world but also the world as the
matrix from which selves spring and the habitat in which they dwell). Trust might – in
truth, trust must – survive the process of maturation. This actually reverses the order or,
more precisely, suggests too simple a picture of the place of trust in this process, for trust
needs to be seen as integral to the origin of this process as much as observable as a result.
Trust as that which survives the process is a transformation of what inaugurates and, at
every turn, sustains the process. In fact, the process of maturation is arrested in the most
tragic  ways  when  the  self  is  unable  or  unwilling  to  trust  itself  or  the  world  in  a
sufficiently expansive and (in certain respects) reckless manner.14 Again, the inability or
unwillingness  of  individuals  to  trust  themselves  is  ultimately  identifiable  with  their
incapacity  or  refusal  to  trust  the  world  as  a  stage,  especially  for  their  unrehearsed
exertions  and  interventions.  Self-trust  is  almost  certainly  the  better  name  for  what
Emerson celebrates in “Self-Reliance” and it is indeed one of the names he himself uses to
identify the object of his praise. Self-trust does not preclude self-suspicion or self-doubt
of every sort; indeed, it often invites and even demands that certain suspicions be take
seriously, that certain doubts be pressed strenuously.
17 No  philosopher  has  enabled  us  to  appreciate  the  contemporary  relevance  of
transcendentalist authors (especially Emerson and Thoreau) more than Stanley Cavell. In
particular, his reading of Emerson is truly Emersonian. On this occasion, however, I want
to turn most of all to Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage, a work no
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less inspired by Emerson than, say, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome or This New Yet
Unapproachable  America.  What  Cavell  in  this  book  says  about  film  is  immediately
applicable to music. So, when he asserts, “A reading of a film sets up a continuous appeal
to the experience of the film, or rather an active memory of the experience (an active
anticipation of acquiring the experience)” (1981: 11), we might immediately translate:
Listening to a piece of music “sets up a continuous appeal to the experience of the film,
etc.” It demands us to check the work or performance out, again and again, but also to
check out (to take careful note of) our critical responses and imperfect understanding,
then,  finally,  to  check  (or  suspend)  our  juridical  impulses  and even to  tarry  in  our
imperfect understanding.15 Even popular films such as The Lady Eve or The Philadelphia
Story are to be read as carefully as philosophical texts; but, then, pieces of music are to be
listened to as painstakingly as such films.
18 “Checking one’s experience is,” Cavell  suggests,  “a rubric an American, or a spiritual
American, might give to the empiricism practiced by Emerson and by Thoreau” (Cavell
1981:  12).  To  be  engaged  with  a  film  or  a  piece  of  music  demands  checking  one’s
experience of that engagement.  But there is an intended ambiguity here:  on the one
hand, we need to check our experience in the sense of consulting it; on the other, we need
to check it in the sense a pilot tests the controls on a plane. Cavell is explicit in stressing
this twofold sense plus yet a third meaning: “I mean the rubric [of checking one’s experience
] to capture the sense at the same time of consulting one’s experience and subjecting it to
an examination, and beyond these, of momentarily stopping, turning yourself away from
its expected, habitual track, to find itself,  its own track: coming to attention” (Cavell
1981:12). He is also emphatic about the purpose of doing so: “The moral of this practice is
to educate your experience sufficiently so that it is worthy of trust” (Cavell 1981: 12, emphasis
added). Encouraged by Emerson and Thoreau, “one learns,” Cavell adds, that without this
trust in one’s own experience, expressed as a willingness to find words for it [at least, as a
drive to articulate it  in some medium or other,  though not necessarily in language],
without  thus  taking  an  interest  in  it,  one  is  without  is  without  authority  in  one’s  own
experience”  (emphasis  added;  cf.  Philosophy  the  Day  After  Tomorrow).  Such  self-trust  is
however  only  one  half  (or  less)  of  the  story.  For  it  “is  fundamental  to  this  view of
experience not to accept any given experience as final but to subject the experience and
its  object  to  the  test  of  one  another.”  Accordingly,  the  appeal  to  experience,  so
understood, cannot avoid being somewhat convoluted: it must turn upon itself, in order
to be able more confidently in the future to turn to itself. This appeal does so, initially, for
the  sake  of  testing  but,  ultimately,  for  the  sake  of  strengthening  and  solidifying
experience, as a resource for improvisation.
19 The  philosophical  appeal  to  experience  is  ordinarily  conceived  in  a  narrowly
epistemological context, whereas the critical or reflective appeal (cf. Diamond 2012; cf.
Murdoch 1997: 33-42, i.e., “Thinking and Language”) being advocated here is envisioned
in reference to the entire range of human engagements (Smith 1981). Part of the task of
the pragmatists no less than the perfectionists is to re-make the philosophical appeal into
such a reflective appeal,  the appeal  of  situated agents (or implicated actors)  to their
personal in- volvement in an ongoing endeavor. The concern is not to rise above, but to go
on: the accent falls not on transcendence and distance but immanence and involvement
(or participation). It involves, at once, appropriating more fully our own experience and
imaginatively distancing ourselves from that experience in such a way as to open a range
of possibilities not otherwise available to us. The paradox here is that in making our
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experience more truly our own we make ourselves other than we have been: in making
my experience more fundamentally mine I make me into someone else, the most intimate of
strangers, the most uncanny of intimates.
20 A truly critical appeal to experience must, I urge, take the form outlined by Cavell in the
passages  from Pursuits  of  Happiness  quoted above.  It  exhibits  the degree and form of
selftrust requisite for self-interrogation. It fights against nostalgia. In Philosophy the Day
After Tomorrow, Cavell astutely observes: “Nostalgia is an inability to open the past to the
future, as if the strangers who will replace you will never find what you have found”
(Cavell 2005: 218). In fighting against nostalgia, however, someone making such an appeal
fights for the present. But it fights for the present precisely as the site wherein creativity
emerges and often explodes upon the scene.16 We might  take extemporaneity as  the
opposite of nostalgia as Cavell defines the latter word in Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow.
Whereas nostalgia is the inability or perhaps the unwillingness to open the past to the
future, extemporaneity can be understood as the willingness to trust both our present
resources and future practitioners sufficiently to open the past to the future. Of course,
the present alone can be the site in which the past  is  opened,  by the creative exertions of
extemporaneous actors implicated in unfolding dramas, to the future (cf. LW 14, Ch. 22).
The open-ended lineage provides, among other things, paths back to earlier moments of
inspiration. The innovations of Milton do not cut us off from Shakespeare, any more than
those of Charlie Parker cut us off from the improvisations of Louis Armstrong. The drive
forward very often makes available to us the past from which it pushes off. Indeed, by
virtue of such innovations and improvisations, the past is rendered more vibrantly and
vitally available to us than unimaginative replications would leave it. While nostalgia is
unable – or unwilling – to expose the past to the risks of the future, self-trust is more
than self-trust: it encompasses trust of our successors to make of the past something vital
and vibrant, also of the past itself to be able to incorporate our modifications without
destroying its integrity.
 
The Preordained and the Extemporaneous
21 A conversation is, Michael Oakeshott suggests, “an unrehearsed intellectual adventure”
(Oakeshott 1991: 490). While being an intellectual adventure, a conversation can also be a
personal, social, cultural, and political one as well. More than anything else, what makes
such  a  multifaceted  adventure  possible  –  of  greatest  pertinence,  what  enables  an
unrehearsed sequence of distinct gestures to add up to a more or less coherent whole – are
past performances. These are in effect rehearsals, while sometimes they are in intent just
that: deliberate preparations for extemporaneous performances. Although there might be
a paradox here, there is no contradiction. Let me try to explain why. If everything in
one’s past in effect serves as a rehearsal for what one is now extemporaneously doing,
then that might seem to preclude extemporaneity. The opposite is, in truth, the case: no
amount of rehearsal or preparation eradicates entirely the need for improvisation, no
matter  how  unimaginatively  meet  or  mechanically  satisfied.  The  living  organism  is
blessed – and cursed – with an immeasurable degree of irrepressible spontaneity, despite
some regimes of discipline to transform the human animal into a perfectly predictable or,
simply, a thoroughly reliable automaton. Extemporaneity cannot be eradicated: the life of
the  organism  is  realized  in  time  and,  moreover,  the  unpredictable  sequence  of
interpenetrating  events  is  both  itself  a  site  of  novelty  and an  invitation  to  respond
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creatively to what is unfolding, here and now (in other words, to the cutting edge of some
inherent tendencies in the temporal continuum of lived experience).
22 What gives any human action both its immediate point and its ineluctable claim upon an
intelligibility  far  transcending  any  actual  moment,  especially  an  intelligibility  far
transcending the immediate present, is a vast, vague background of actions, agents, and
the world in which the strivings, struggles, defeats, and successes alone make sense. Our
performances, even our most routine ones, are to some degree improvisations.
23 What makes an unrehearsed performance possible is, paradoxically, the ordinarily vast
repertoire of prior performances. But the performer has not done precisely this before.
What the past performances enable is a truly present performance, more differentially
responsive to the unique demands of the actual situation (cf.  MW 14:  Ch. 18).  Such a
performance is not a mere replication of previous exertions. It is inevitably, if not always
obviously, let alone dramatically, an instance of repetition and difference (cf. Deleuze
1994), thus an instance wherein the repetition is inherently a moment of differentiation,
whereas the difference is inevitably a phase in a process wherein echoes and traces of
other phases are legible. Closely connected to this point, it is as inheritors that we are
improvisers.  The very process of  inheritance is  far from an unimaginative or indeed
passive one. Think here of how a child acquires language. At the heart of this acquisition,
there is the creative, playful, and (in many respects) spontaneous engagement with the
competent speakers of a linguistic community. Linguistic inheritance is both a personal
and communal achievement; moreover, it is the result of (again) both an imitative and a
creative activity on the part of the inheritor.
24 For the most part, breaking “free” of a tradition has point and power, justification and
value, only as an act wherein someone appropriates more deeply some resource of the very
tradition from which the individual is struggling to free herself. It is rarely the case that
we can break free in any decisive, let alone any thoroughgoing, way from a tradition in
which we  have  been reared  (see  Scott  1996  on lineage).  The  contemporary  contrast
between “traditional” and “modern” societies is to a great degree an instance of self-
mystification. Premodern societies are claimed by many social theorists to be traditional,
whereas modern ones are said by these theorists to be post-traditional (Giddens 1990: 4).
Is  any  human  society  so  bound  by  tradition  as  to  preclude  the  very  possibility  of
extemporaneity? So, too, is any culture so structured by its rejection of tradition as to
escape the claims and influence of an intricate meshwork of intersecting traditions?17 Is
not  anti-traditionalism itself  a  tradition characteristic  of  a  certain epoch in Western
history?
25 Conversin’  with  the  Elders  is  the title  of  a  CD by James Carter  (cf.  Colapietro 2009).  It
reminds  us  of  a  leitmotiv  in  this  paper:  the  metaphor  of  conversation.  The  most
innovative jazz musicians know the “music” and this practically means that they know a
variety  of  traditions  of  musicking  (Small  1998a).  The  conversation  in  question  is
ineluctably intergenerational. It is, in its innermost character, an ongoing tradition: as
such,  it  is  a  transformative  process  in  which  representative  figures  from  distinct
traditions,  most  urgently  immediate  elders  and  their  more  or  less  acknowledged
offspring18 oppose  one  another,  learn  from  one  another,  cast  aspersions,  utter
denouncements, offer encouragement, maintain affection, and do much else.
26 The scenes  of  our  everyday lives  are  ones  of  vital  improvisation.19 In  this  quotidian
sphere, we are doing nothing less than making up our lives as we go along.20 There are, to
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be  sure,  inherited  scripts  or  (more  appropriate  for  this  context)  inherited charts  or
scores.  The  relationship  between score  and performance,  analogous  to  that  between
dictionary and usage, deserves comment here.
27 Those brought up in literate cultures in which formal documents are invested with sacred
authority or,  at least,  something akin to such authority,  also ones in which symbolic
practices such as storytelling, musicking, and of course governing require (at least for
culturally  recognized  or  authoritative  practitioners)  specific  forms  of  literary
competence, are likely to misunderstand what is most vital. The constitution of a country
is,  for  example,  a  distillation of  the  commitments  of  a  people.  Its  locus  is  first  and
foremost in the habits of its citizens,  including the disposition to check their actions
against the document itself (i.e., against the explicit protocols of those earlier citizens in
whom present citizens continue to invest a constitutive authority). Or take the example
of a dictionary. Indeed, just what is a dictionary? Though odd sounding, the question is
far from unintelligible; though not obviously germane to our inquiry, it is in fact of the
greatest  salience.  The  normative  function of  a  carefully  compiled  lexicon  cannot  be
denied. But just what is a dictionary and how does it acquire its widely acknowledged
authority regarding the (at least) apparent vagaries of contemporary usage? A dictionary
is,  at  bottom,  a  compilation  of  reminders  of  how a  particular  linguistic  community
actually uses words. But why does actual usage dictate or determine proper usage? More
pointedly, why is it not appropriate to insist that the way words have been actually used
by the community in which I am a participant cannot by itself determine the way they
ought to be used here and now? How can mere facts about established usage determine
semantic norms regarding the permissible or, more strongly, requisite deployment of a
determinate set of linguistic signs?
28 These questions cannot be adequately addressed here. They can be barely addressed at
all.  Suffice  it  to  say,  on  this  occasion,  that  we  ultimately  have  to  fall  back  on  the
confession, “This is simply what we do – or what we say” (cf. Wittgenstein). We can of
course give reasons or, just as likely, elaborate narratives that go some distance toward
making what we do or say intelligible.  Beyond this, we can go some distance toward
justifying these practices,  but the justification cannot avoid being circular.  There are
circles and there are circles. If the circle takes the form of a spiral, and in turn if the
spiral is invincibly, ineluctably, open-ended, the circularity of our justification need not
be vicious.
29 What is true of constitutions and dictionaries is,  mutatis mutandis,  true of scripts and
scores.  In  a  culture  such  as  ours,  one  disposed  to  invest  the  highest  authority  in
formalized  procedures,  codes,  and  protocols,  it  is  commonplace  to  see  a  musical
performance  as  secondary  to  a  formal  score.  The  authority  and  originality  of  the
composer of such a score are, to a remarkable degree, allowed to constrain, if not to
eclipse entirely,  the creativity and resourcefulness of  the performers (Small).  It  is  as
though the dictionary dictated in the most minutely detailed manner the vocalizations of
speakers in situ. There is much to be said for the dominant forms of Western musicking,
with their overriding emphasis on musical literacy and the exacting “interpretation” of
magisterial compositions. But the rigidly hierarchical world of such musicking, also the
commitment  to  an  antecedently  scripted  performance,  stand  in  stark  opposition  to
fluidly democratic relationships and vibrantly extemporaneous performances. The rigidly
hierarchical and antecedently fixed cannot, from the perspective of either pragmatism or
perfectionism, be allowed to preclude the flexibly democratic and historically emergent.
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The extemporaneous creativity of unrehearsed conversation, in its most quotidian forms
no less than in its more disciplined ones,21 needs to be accorded wider recognition and
greater authority than they have at present. This brings us, at last, to our ultimate aim:
jazz improvisation as an arresting example of just such extemporaneous creativity.
 
Time as Experience/Experience as Temporality:
Reprise
30 Let us very quickly recall, with James’s assistance, some of the most salient features of
human experience. “The fundamental fact about our experience is,” James stresses, “that
it is a process of change” (MT: 220).  With a slight but significant variation, he notes:
“experience as a whole is a process in time, whereby innumerable terms lapse and are
superseded by others that follow upon them by transitions […] which are themselves
experiences, and must in general be accounted at least as real as the terms which they
relate”  (MT:  231).  Whatever  is  immediate  in  any  experience  is,  James  adds,  always
provisionally so and indeed situationally so. “But owing to the fact that all experience is a
process, no point of view can ever be the last one. Every one is insufficient and off its balance, and
responsible to later points of view than itself” (MT: 221; emphasis added). “Experience leads
ever on and on, and objects and our ideas of objects may lead to the same goal” (MT: 258).
“Experience is a process that continually gives us new material to digest” (MT: 208).
31 For our purposes, then, it is critical to stress that human experience is a temporal process
in which time as experience assumes myriad forms. But time is first and foremost an affair
of transitions, also one of transmutations, transformations, and even transfigurations.
32 Our  understanding  or  our  own  experience  is inescapably  partial,  provisional,  and
perspectival. Returning even to the most familiar experiences can, if that return is truly
reflective  and  hence  imaginative,  yield  fresh  insights,  surprising  illumination  (cf.
Diamond 2012).
33 Acknowledging our finitude means, among other things, abandoning the ideal of finality.
The ongoing flux of our finite lives implies just what James emphasizes in a text just
quoted: “no point of view can ever be the last one. Every one is insufficient and off its
balance, and responsible to later points of view than itself.” But what he claims regarding
science (more precisely,  a  certain understanding of  scientific  accomplishment)  might
have much wider applicability. In The Varieties of Religious Experience, he suggests:
[T]he divorce between scientific facts and religious facts may not necessarily be as
eternal as it at first sight seems, nor the personalism and romanticism of the world
[…] be matters so irrevocably outgrown. The final human opinion may, in short, in
some manner now impossible to foresee, revert to the personal style, just as any
path of progress may follow a spiral rather than a straight line. If this were so, the
rigorously  impersonal  view  of  science  might  appear  one  day  as  having  been  a
temporarily useful expedient rather than the definitively triumphant position which the
sectarian scientist at present so confidently announces it to be. (James 1985: 395,
note 8, emphasis added)
34 In a universe such as ours, especially for a species such as us, definitively triumphant
positions are unobtainable. The best we can ever aspire to reach are temporarily useful
expedients. Their utility may of course span decades or even centuries; but it does so
principally by their remarkable adaptability to novel circumstances In other words, there
are definitive accomplishments,  exemplary performances,  but they fall  short of being
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absolutely  definitive  or  unsurpassably  exemplary.  The  accomplishments  of,  say,
Copernicus, Newton, Darwin, and Einstein unquestionably define for us what the practice
of science must mean, just as the performances of (say) Armstrong, Ellington, Parker, and
Coltrane exemplify what musical improvisation can be.
35 Rigorous  formalism  is  more  often  than  not  an  invaluable  discipline,  at  least  when
subjection to the rigors of this discipline is voluntarily embraced rather than externally
imposed.  But formal anarchism, at  least  in a weak sense,22 can be no less valuable a
personal discipline,23 at least when the demands of sustaining such a stance (rather than
simply the initial impulse to break free from established forms) are imaginatively and,
thus,  courageously  met.  The  initial  impulse  exposes  itself  as  infantile  or,  at  best,
adolescent, if it does not struggle to find ways of going on.24 The spirit of such anarchism,
at  least  with respect  to philosophy,  is  exuberantly expressed by James in a letter to
Bergson (December 14, 1902) when he proclaims: “How good it is sometimes simply to
break away from all the old categories, deny old worn-out beliefs, and restate things ab
initio, making the lines of division fall into entirely new places!” (Perry: 606). Of course, it
is impossible completely to break away from “all  the old categories,” to deny all  our
inherited beliefs. The process of twisting free, however partial and provisional, from the
constitutive forms of some consolidated practice may be truly emancipatory,  because
transformatively enlivening. As Paul Klee notes in one of his notebooks, “form is the end,
death. Form-giving is movement, action. Form-giving is life.”
36 From  a  pragmatist  perspective  (at  least,  from  a  Deweyan  one),  virtually  all  art  is
improvisational. In many cases, perhaps most, however, what we encounter is the product 
of improvisation, not the process itself (cf. Sawyer 2000: 149-50). But the product bears
the traces of  its  origin in such a process.  At  least,  this  is  Dewey’s  position:  “A rigid
predetermination of an end product whether by artist or beholder leads to the turning
out of a mechanical or academic product” (LW 10: 143; cf. Sawyer 2000: 154). Artists of
course care about what shape or form their works take; but they tend to care about “the
end-result as a completion of what goes before and not because of its conformity or lack
of conformity with a ready-made antecedent scheme” (LW 10: 143). The self-trust of the
artist is as much as anything a trust in the process: its characteristic form is a far from
begrudging willingness “to leave the outcome to the adequacy of the means from which it
issues and which it sums up.” In the case of some artists, however, such self-trust points
toward the felt inadequacy of means toward which the work points and which it as yet
has failed to attain. The work as a work is an invitation to take up and renew the efforts
of the artist to carry forward the process, but this task requires developing means beyond
anything presently possessed.  Artists trust themselves and their audiences enough to
devote themselves to the cultivation of unprecedented skills and sensitivities, that is, to
hope that sustained, imaginative effort will equip them with what neither they nor their
audience now possess. In any event, the “consummatory phase of experience – which is
intervening as well as final – always presents something new. Admiration always includes
an element of  wonder.” (LW 10:  143-44).  For Dewey,  then,  art  is  always the result  of
improvisation, even when the process by which the work came into being is, at least in
part, hidden from those who encounter the work afterwards. Given the importance of
this point, quoting Dewey at further length seems warranted:
The  unexpected  turn,  something  which  the  artists  himself  does  not  definitely
foresee, is a condition of the felicitous quality of a work of art; it saves it from being
mechanical.  It  gives  the  spontaneity  of  the  unpremeditated  to  what  would
otherwise be a fruit of calculation. The painter and poet like the scientific inquirer
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know the delights of discovery. Those who carry on their work as a demonstration
of  a  preconceived thesis  may have the joys  of  egotistic  success  but  not  that  of
fulfillment of an experience for its own sake. In the latter they learn by their work,
as  they  proceed,  to  see  [or  perceive]  and feel  what  had not  been part  of  their
original plan and purpose.25 (LW 10: 144)
37 Those works having the power to arrest and sustain our attention trace their origin, in
part, to the unexpected turn, the unpremeditated effect, the creative process itself as an
unrehearsed  conversation  with  a  sensuous  medium,  various  traditions,  inchoate
impulses,  dispositional  tendencies,  and  much  else.  The  work  flows  from such  a
conversation and embodies in itself the traces of this give-and-take, even when its form
is, as in the case of a painting or a piece of sculpture, static (or synchronic) in some sense.
38 But music is inherently diachronic and, thus, perceptibly dynamic or fluid, while some
forms of musicking are unquestionably extemporaneous. In the case of these forms, we
might  highlight  a  handful  of  features  especially  relevant  to  the  topic  of  this  paper.
Musical improvisations such as those exemplified by Louis Armstrong’s West End Blues,
Paul Gonsalves’s solo on Diminuendo in Blue, Charlie Parker’s Koko, John Coltrane’s Naima,
or Sonny Rollins’s Green Dolphin Street are themselves works of art crafted, intentionally
yet spontaneously, as processes of improvisation. We are confronted with an invitational
process, not a finished product merely suggestive of its improvisational origin. In the case
of such improvisations, we are invited into the process in a more immediate and dramatic
manner  than  we  are  when  the  product  is  presented  apart  from  the  process  of  its
origination.  Such a process precisely qua improvisation is:  transactional,  emergentist,
collaborative,  unpredictable,  problematizing,26 and hence expressive  beyond anything
intended by, or known to, the improvisers at the time of their collaboration.27 What might
seem contradictory  to  some,  jazz  ensembles  rehearse  to  prepare  themselves  for  the
exacting demands of “an unrehearsed adventure” in real time before a live audience.
Though  some  claim that  such  a  performance  precludes  the  possibility  of  editing  or
revising, it might be more accurate to say that what we are witnessing is a process of
revising, though one that involves no less than re-envisioning what one is doing, what
counts as a problem or difficulty.
39 What emerges from such a process is exactly what G. H. Mead highlights when he defines
emergence. Much of his reflection on time is organized around the insight (at least, the
claim) that “a reality that transcends the present must exhibit  itself  in the present”
(Mead 1932: 11; cf. Mead 1938: 640-43). “The emergent when it appears is always found to
follow from the past, but before it appears it does not, by definition, follow from the past”
(Mead  1932:  2,  emphasis  added).  To  insist  that  the  emergent  must  be,  in  principle,
deducible from the past is to break with the pragmatists, for whom the universe is shot
through with contingency and novelty. The novel and the contingent are not necessarily
illusions  due to  our  ignorance of  the  laws  governing phenomena;  they are,  in  some
instances  at  least,  nothing  less  than  features  of  reality  itself.  The  demands  of
intelligibility dispose us to stress continuity with the past and thereby compromise the
extent  to  which  the  irreducibly  novel  explodes  upon  the  scene,  in  the  present.  In
contrast, the celebration of novelty inclines us to highlight rupture with precedent or
antecedent. The pragmatist orientation invites us to take seriously the possibility of there
emerging, here and now, novel forms of intelligibility (cf. Hausman 1984), but to treat no
less  earnestly  the  threads  of  continuity  between  the  unfinished  present  and  an
apparently irrevocable past (see, however, Mead 1932: 2). For Mead, at least, “there is and
always will be a necessary relation of the past and the present but […] the present in
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which the emergent  appears  accepts  that  which is  novel  as  an essential  part  of  the
universe, and from that standpoint rewrites the universe” (Mead 1932: 11). It is, in Mead’s
judgment, nothing less than the task of philosophy “to bring into congruence with each
other this universality of determination which is the text of modern science, and the
emergence of the novel” (Mead 1932: 14; cf. Sawyer 2000: 152). The emergence of novelty
might be identified as the “text” of modern life, nowhere more legible than in the arts
expressive of the ethos of modernity and its discontents.
40 The forms we have inescapably acquired in the course of our lives are either accorded the
status of forms in the sense denigrated by Klee or they are deployed as resources for
form-giving beyond anything dictated by these forms themselves. That is, they are either
dead and deadening things or living and enlivening ones. The given forms are frequently
accorded the status of absolutely authoritative texts, scripts, or scores; or, alternatively,
the given forms are treated primarily as immediate resources for form-giving. Regarding
the latter,  the function of  intelligence in its  most  vital  form is  the introduction and
nurturance  of  novelty  (Whitehead  1929  [1971]:  25;  also  27,  32).  Such  intelligence  is
observable in virtually all domains of experience, but nowhere more manifestly than in
the forms of musicking commonly called jazz improvisation.
41 It  might  be  an  exaggeration  to  assert,  “the  history  of  pragmatism  survives  most
unexpectedly,  and  therefore  most  startlingly,  in  black  music  and  contemporary
experimental writing” (Magee 2004: 179). It is, however, no exaggeration at all to claim
that the spirit animating especially James’s pragmatism and indeed Cavell’s perfectionism
is truly akin to that animating these forms of musicking and writing. The philosophical
celebration of  creative  intelligence obtains  pertinence and power  when conjoined to
historical instantiations of extemporaneous creativity.
42 For much of our history, the achievements of art no less than those of philosophy have
seemed to enable the transcendence of time, as such. More recently, however, an ethos of
immanence  has  in  certain  circles,  including  those  of  pragmatists  and  perfectionists,
discredited the ideal of such transcendence. But we are not imprisoned in time or history
any more than we are in our own bodies. Whatever forms of transcendence are available
to us, they are available in and through our temporality and historicity no less than our
embodiment and sociality. In a poem (“in the time of daffodils,” e. e. cummings insists,
parenthetically,  “(time  from  time  shall  set  us  free).”  Pragmatists  and  perfectionists
remove the parentheses: this is hardly an aside or a line to be separated, however slightly,
from what  most  demands utterance. Only  time from time shall  set  us  free  and such
freedom is itself only a critical distance – better, a creative distance – from some facets of
our inheritances and traditions, not from inheritance or tradition as such. Even so, the
instances of twisting free from time in time is at once a human commonplace (witness the
irrepressible  spontaneity  of  ever  yday  conversations)  and a  remarkable  achievement
(witness the exemplary improvisations of such jazz musicians as Charlie Parker, Miles
Davis, Bill Evans, John Coltrane, or Sonny Rollins). The given forms give way to form-
giving, when just the right tone in an everyday exchange is struck or when jazz truly
becomes (in the words of Sonny Rollins), “the music of surprise,” for the performers (at
least) as much as the auditory collaborators (i.e., what is ordinarily called the audience or
listeners).
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Conclusion
43 Jazz  improvisation  is  just  a  dramatic  example  of  a  pervasive  feature  of  human
comportment.  The  spontaneous  creativity  exhibited  in  our  everyday  extemporaneity
cannot be gainsaid. Human perception is an endless source of irreducible novelty, but our
conceptualization of our own perceptions tend, as James so brilliantly made clear,  to
efface  the  novelty  no  less  than the  fluidity  of  our  experience.  Reason as  a  juridical
capacity  is  not  to  be  utterly  denigrated;  it  however  needs  to  be  supplemented.
Intelligence as an irrepressible drive toward extemporaneous novelty needs to be seen for
what it is – the human face of human rationality (again, cf. Whitehead 1929 [1971]; also
MW 14: 48-49, 134-38; LW 1, Ch. 10). The ongoing critique of reason is simultaneously an
ever  deeper  interrogation  of  experience.  When  this  interrogation  is  undertaken  for
rendering our experience more luminous,  intense, differential,  sustaining, and indeed
startling (LW 1: 18; 305; also LW 10: 41), the appeal to experience is made, in a single
stroke, more critical and more humane.
44 Self-trust in its most admirable form underwrites self-interrogation of a relentless and (in
certain respects)  frequently  ruthless  character. Self-interrogation in  such an adverse
form alone makes our trust in our own experience trustworthy, for it helps to transform
experience into something more secure yet  plastic,  more stable  yet  protean,  than it
otherwise would be. These are, at least, the directions in which we are invited to move –
the ways we might go on – in light of our experience of extemporaneity (at least,  as I
interpret this experience).
45 These  modes  of  temporality  constitutive  of  this  experience  –  e.g.,  the  unblinking
confrontation  with  the  irrevocability  of  any  actual  past  linked  to  the  imaginative
resignification  of  the  import  of  this  irrevocable  actuality;  the  present  as  a  scene  of
struggle between a stubborn past  and an irrepressible future;  the future as,  at  once,
elusive and fateful – (the modes of temporality) are, especially as affective processes of
personal  entanglement,  nowhere more sensuously  available  to  us  than in musicking,
above all, jazz improvisation. Put far more simply, time as experience and experience as
temporality are articulated more arrestingly, intricately, and emphatically in musicking
than anywhere else. In music, art as experience takes the form of time as experience. In
this form, our experience of time and the temporality of experience are not so much
made into objects of contemplation (though to some extent this is true) as we are made
into processes of transitions, transience, and transfiguration. That is, the human animal
is  afforded  a  unique  opportunity  to  have  the  time  of  its  life,  in  the  multifarious
configurations  in  which  experienced  time  unfolds,  above  all,  in  the  interstices  of
everyday life. Experience is first and foremost had, not known (LW 1: 28).28 But there is
having  and  there  is  having!  Experience  had  as  art  –  time  had  as  music  –  are  more
philosophically illuminating and, of greater importance, more humanly centering than
philosophers and indeed other theorists have yet discerned (cf. Bowie 2009).
46 My reflections on time as experience are designed, more than anything else, to exemplify
a way we as philosophers might go on – and go on in an innovative way. In our most
creative  moments,  our  unwitting  quotations  of  others  are  audible  (cf.,  once  again,
Emerson’s  “Quotation  and  Originality”).  But,  in  our  most  seemingly  routine
performances,  a  nuanced extemporaneity  (however  slight  and thus  imperceptible)  is
discoverable.  Time  as  experience  is,  accordingly,  best  approached  in  reference  to
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experience as extemporaneity: the cutting edge of our ongoing experience is, in effect, a
musical gesture. The significance of this gesture is affectively had only as a moment unto
itself and a phase of transition from what precedes to what follows this moment. The
intelligibility of this gesture forever eludes those who lack a feel for what is to be had in
such sequences, ones often punctuated by a single note held for a sustained duration, but
more often by a rapid sequence of different notes organized along distinct axes.  The
medium of articulation can only be that of music itself (Bowie 2009), though verbal and
other forms of commentary might send us back to a piece or performance with new ears,
with a more probing and appreciative feel for what resounds in this medium.
47 “We humans,” James insists,  are incurably rooted in the temporal point of view. The
eternal’s  ways are utterly unlike our ways” (James 1977 [1909]:  23).  But much of the
history of philosophy has been animated by an impulse to transcend temporality and,
thereby, to make our ways the eternal’s ways. What the pragmatists in their way and
Cavell in his make clear is what another inhabitant of Cambridge, MA, noted when he
wrote, “time from time shall set us free” (cummings). The transcendence of time is a
transition  and  indeed  an  achievement  in  time.  The  experience  of  eternity  is,
paradoxically, an arresting moment in the ongoing rush of the temporal flux itself. Very
few people who have ever listened to music have not felt themselves to be lifted out of
time and suspended in eternity, however briefly (!). Our experience of music discloses the
feel of time, including the felt sense of a present possibly inclusive of the entirety of past,
present, and future (Neville), better than any other medium of articulation, not least of
all because this experience is itself essentially temporal. Time is of the essence – of music.
In  its  affectively  charged  disclosure29 of  the  most  intricate  textures  of  experiential
temporality,  we  are  provided  with  an  impetus  to  acknowledge30 that  we  are indeed
“incurably rooted in the temporal point of view.”
48 Temporality and the perspective it demands of us are, however, not diseases. They are
decidedly not anything from which we need to be cured.  Much rather,  philosophical
therapy  is  needed  for  counteracting  our  insistence  upon casting  ourselves  as  time’s
stepchildren31 (Lovibond 1983: 206). Despite our fantasies, philosophical and otherwise,
we were not abandoned by eternity on time’s doorstep one cold evening: we were formed
and nurtured in time’s womb and exiled into other spheres of temporality. Music more
than anything else and jazz more than any other form of music help us to avoid this
impiety inherent in the fantasy that we are eternity’s child (cf. Santayana on impiety). As
agents,  we  are  in  no  small  measure  the  playthings  of  time.  But,  precisely  as  such
playthings, we can mount our resistance and improvise the script or (better) the score as
we have inherited it, if only just a moment ago. Extemporaneity is shot through with
resistance  and  reparation,  rejection  and  reconciliation,  implosion  and  renovation,
quotation and originality, repetition and – difference. The sensuous shapes of musical
extemporaneity are, in sum, invaluable for discerning this and much more.
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NOTES
1. In Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, Stanley Cavell writes: “Perfectionism, as I think of it, is
not a competing theory of the moral life, but something like a dimension or tradition of the
moral life that spans the course of Western thought and concerns what used to be called the state
of one’s soul, a dimension that places enormous burdens on personal relationships and on the
possibility or necessity of the transforming of oneself and of one’s society …” (Cavell 1990: 2). See
Falomi 2010. In identifying this as my ultimate goal, I am not suggest- ing or implying that this –
or this alone – is my main goal. I have several principal objectives, this being only one of them.
Indeed,  this  essay  is  as  much,  if  not  more,  a  reflection  on  the  most  appropriate  form  of
experiential appeal as it is a treatment of improvisation.
2. I do not mean to blur the differences between pragmatism and perfectionism, much less to
suggest an exact equivalence or an easy harmony between Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead, on
the one side, and Stanley Cavell, Garry Hagberg, Richard Eldridge, and others, on the other side.
In other words, I  take with the utmost seriousness what Cavell  argues in “What’s the Use of
Calling Emerson a Pragmatist?” and what he asserts,  for  example in Conditions  Handsome and
Unhandsome (see especially Cavell 1990: 13).
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3. “Tradition and custom, especially when emotionally charged, are a part of the habits that have
become one with our very being” (LW 9: 11).
4. In “The Development of American Pragmatism” (1925), Dewey insists: “reason, or thought, in
its  most general  sense,  has a real,  though limited function,  a  creative,  constructive function”
(LW 2: 13; emphasis added).
5. I am borrowing this term from Christopher Small. In Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and
Listening,  he  informs us  that:  The word “is  the  present  participle,  or  gerund,  of  the verb to
music.” For the verb, he proposes this definition: “To music is to take part in, in any capacity, in a
musical  performance,  whether  by  performing,  by  listening,  by  rehearsing  or  praticising,  by
providing material for performance (what is called composing), or by dancing” (Small 1998a: 9;
italics omitted).
6. In “Poetry and Philosophy” (1890), a commencement address given at Smith College, Dewey
asserts: “after all, science means only knowledge – philosophy, only love of wisdom, only the
essay at reaching the meaning of this experience of ours” (EW 3: 112). Cf. his “Philosophy and
Civilization.” Philosophy is, first and foremost, at attempt to understand more fully and deeply
the meaning of our own experience.
7. In “How Should One Read a Book?” Virginia Woolf insists:  “To admit authorities,  however
furred and gowned, into our libraries and let them tell us how to read, what to read, what value
to place upon what we read, is to destroy the spirit of freedom which is the breath of those
sanctuaries. Everywhere else we may be bound by laws and conventions – there we have none”
(Woolf 1932: 234). But she is quick to point out that freedom in any meaningful sense involves
more than being out from under the dictates of authority: “To enjoy freedom […] we have to
control ourselves. We must not squander our powers, squirting half the house in order to water a
single rose-bud; we must train them, exactly and powerfully, here on the very spot.” For such
self-training the advice and suggestions of the experienced reader can, of course, be invaluable.
8. In  Human  Nature  and  Conduct  (1922),  Dewey  stresses:  “There  is  instinctive  wisdom  in  the
tendency of the young to ignore the limitations of the environment. Only thus can they discover
their own power and learn the differences in different kinds of environing limitations. But this
discovery  when  once  made  marks  the  birth  of  intelligence;  and  with  its  birth  comes  the
responsibility of the mature to observe, to recall, to forecast” (MW 14: 118).
9. This expression and its use as part of the title for this essay is, of course, indebted to the title
of one of Dewey’s most important works, Art as Experience.
10. Our habits are what we primarily go on. “Experience is,” Dewey asserts in a late manuscript,
“no stream, even though the stream of feelings and ideas (that flows upon its surface is the part
which  philosophers  love  to  traverse.  Experience  [however]  includes  the  enduring  banks  of
natural constitution and acquired habit as well as the stream” (LW 1: 370).
11. Though I am quoting an instance of this remark as found in one of his published works, this
was a point that John Smith was fond of making in informal conversation.
12. “For we do not, after all, simply have experience; we are,” Patricia Hampl stresses, “entrusted
with it. We must do something – make something – with it. A story, we sense, is the only possible
habitation of the burden of our witnessing” (Hampl 1999: 18).
13. “The great public work of the instrumental philosophy,” Hocking suggests in “Action and
Certainty” (1929/1930), “has been to limber up the ways of knowing of this people [i.e., of the
American people],  to  reduce  fixed dogmas  to  working  hypotheses  fit  for  experiment;  to  the
intellectually  tradition,  authority-seeking,  heroworshipping  American  the  courage  of  his  own
experience, As a people we do believe in the dignity of labor. […] We must carry this belief over in
the dignity of a laboring philosophy, arising out of and pertinent to existing crises, not to ancient
ones” (LW 5: 463; emphasis added).
14. At the conclusion of “Circles,” Emerson observes: “Nothing great was ever achieved without
enthusiasm. The way of life is wonderful; it is by abandonment. The great moments of history are
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the facilities of performance through the strength or ideas, as the works of genius and religion.
‘A man,’ said Oliver Cromwell, ‘never rises so high as when he knows not whither he is going.’
Dreams and drunkenness, the use of opium and alcohol are the semblance and counterfeit of this
oracular genius, and hence their dangerous attraction for men. For the like reason they ask the
aid  of  wild  passions,  to  ape  in  some  manner  these  flames  and  generosities  of  the  heart  ”
(Emerson 1982: 238). In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey highlights another facet of this, one
concerning the orientation of children toward the world: “There is instinctive wisdom in the
tendency of the young to ignore the limitations of the environment. Only thus can they discover
their own power and learn the differences in different kinds of environing limitations” (MW 14:
118).
15. This is what John Keats advises in a letter and, moreover, what Dewey endorses in Art as
Experience: in his famous phrase, this is “Negative Capability.” In his far less famous explication,
Keats  means by this  the capacity  to  live  with “uncertainties,  mysteries,  doubts,  without  any
irritable  reaching  after  fact  and  reason”  (quoted  by  Dewey  in  LW 10:  39).  The  resounding
conclusion of this important chapter, the title of which in part is borrowed from Keats (“The Live
Creature  and  ‘Ethereal  Things’”),  is  worth  recalling  here:  “Ultimately  there  are  but  two
philosophies. One of them accepts life and experience in all its uncertainties, mystery, doubt, and
half-knowledge and turns that experience upon itself to deepen and intensify its own qualities –
to imagination and art. This is the philosophy of Shakespeare and Keats” (LW 10: 41). It is also the
philosophy of Dewey and, arguably, the other pragmatists.
16. In Experience and Education, Dewey identifies a problem that he takes to be “new in the story of
educa-  tion:  How shall  the  young  become  acquainted  with  the  past  in  such  a  way  that  the
acquaintance is a potent agent in appreciation of the living present?” (LW 13: 10). This is in effect
a  corollary  derived  from  James’s  more  general  claim  regarding  human  experience:  nothing
outside of the flux secures the issue of it.
17. In “One Current Religious Problem” (1936), a response to Percy Hughes’s critique of A Common
Faith  and  other  writings  by  Dewey  on  religion,  Dewey  stresses:  “About  the  importance  of
tradition – or, better, traditions – in effecting the desired organization I have no doubt. But I am
high skeptical of all arguments that there is but one available tradition. We have at our disposal
many traditions. There is the great tradition of autonomous literature, of music, of painting, of
all the fine arts, in each of which, moreover, there are many significant traditions. There is the
tradition of democracy; there is the tradition of experimental science, which if not thoroughly
established is yet far from embryonic” (LW 11: 117). In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey insists:
“The level of action fixed by embodied intelligence is always the important thing” (LW 2: 166).
Intelligence is embodied in habits.  It is also concretely embodied in the vast array of human
artifacts without which the more refined dispositions of human agents would could never sustain
themselves, let alone take deep enough root ever to flower.
18. A tradition is very often, if not always, an intergenerational struggle. Such an agon assumes a
more central and intense form in some cultures than in others.
19. “The sweetest music,” Emerson suggests, “is not the oratorio, but in the human voice when it
speaks from its instant life, tones of tenderness, truth, or courage” (CW 2: 216; cf. Day 2000: 105).
20. “Somewhere being must,”  James insists,  “iimediately breast  nonentity.  Why may not the
advancing  front  of  experience,  carrying its  immanent  satisfactions  and  dissatisfactions,  cut
against the black inane as the luminous orb of the moon cuts the cærulean abyss? Why should
anywhere the world be absolutely fixed and finsihed? And if reality genuinely grows, why may it
not grow in these very determinations which here and now are made?” (MT: 222; emphasis added).
“Our acts, our turning-places, where we seem to ourselves to make ourselves and grow, are,” he
asserts  elsewhere,  “the  parts  of  the  world  to  which  we  are  closest, the  parts  of  which  our
knowledge is the most intimate and complete. Why should we not take them at their face-value?
Why may they not be the actual turning-places and growing-places which they seem to be, of the
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world – why not the workshop of being, where we catch fact in the making, so that nowhere may
the world grow in any other kind of way than this?” (James 1978: 138).
21. There is no contradiction here. An extemporaneous performance can be a disciplined one,
above all, because the disciplined attention of improvisational artists is a critical feature in any
successful improvisation. The apparent “abandonment” of control is the suspension of dominant
habits, for the sake of the more or less free play of suppressed ones but also the spontaneous
promptings of inchoate impulses.
22. In a strong sense, an anarchist designates anyone who rejects laws as such; in a weaker sense,
this  term refers  to  an individual  who rejects  the state  as  an institution designed to  enforce
lawfulness. The kind of anarchist toward whom I am gesturing here does not reject forms as
such, but rather the absolute authority of antecedently determined forms and, moreover, the
fixation on form rather than preoccupation with processes of form-giving.
23. “There  is,”  Dewey  suggests  in  Experience  and  Education,  “no  discipline  so  severe  as  the
discipline of experience subjected to the tests of intelligent development and direction” (LW 13:
90). Improvisation is voluntary, frequently joyful subjection to such immanent discipline – the
discipline inherent in the demands, urgencies, and propensities of experience itself. Out of such
discipline, creative intelligence alone is born. Rather than being an advocate of irrationalism or
anti-intellectualism, Dewey was a champion of intelligence in this sense. No sensed more the
vital  role  of  creative  intelligence  “in  the  development  and  control  of  a  living  and  moving
experience” (LW 13: 60). Though in the text to which I am referring Dewey does not append this
adjective to intelligence, there is little or no question that this is implicit in what he is advocating
here.
24. “The release of some portion of the stock of impulses [always available to the live creature]
is,” Dewey notes in Human Nature and Conduct, “an opportunity, not an end. In its origin it is the
product of chance; but it affords imagination and invention their chance. The moral correlate
[also the artistic one] of liberated impulse is not immediate activity, but reflection upon the way
in which to use impulse to renew disposition and reorganize habit” (MW 14: 117). But immediate
activity might be both the initial phase of a reflective process and a promising gesture worthy of
being repeated countless times and, in this process of reiteration, capable of being interrogated
in diverse ways (think here of how a jazz musician will play the same lick over and over again,
altering it ever so slightly, also often quite radically).
25. For the danger of egotism even in improvisation, see Garry Hagberg’s “Jazz Improvisation
and Ethical Interaction: A Sketch of the Connections.” His example of the differences between the
younger and older Stan Getz are especially instructive in this regard.
26. While this term will likely be taken as an allusion to Michel Foucault, and while this would
not be a  mistake,  my use of  it  here refers  primarily  to what Sawyer identifies  as  “problem-
finding” (Sawyer 2000: 153-54). For example, a “‘problem-finding’ painter is constantly searching
for her or his visual problems while painting – improvising a painting rather than executing it”
(Sawyer 2000: 153, emphasis added).
27. Here I am drawing heavily on the work of R. Keith Sawyer. See, in particular, Sawyer 2003. In
a more extended treatment of this elusive topic, I would have to explain more fully what these
terms designate. For the purpose of this paper, however, all I can do is refer my readers to the
work of Sawyer. Nonetheless, I hope to return to this topic and, on that occasion, elaborate in my
own way these salient features of the improvisational process.
28. An earlier but extremely illuminating articulation of this point is “Epistemological Realism:
The Ubiquity of the Knowledge Relation” (MW 6).
29. While not all music is affectively charged, much is. Even those instances where little or no
emotions are given sensuous form or expression in a piece of music,  the textures of time as
experienced are made available to us for contemplation or scrutiny. Those instances in which
conflicts, tensions, and resolutions of an incredibly intricate character, with the characteristic
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emotion involvement  invited by these instances,  are,  however,  sensuous forms in  which the
textures of temporality are made most forcibly but also vividly available to us (see, e.g., Langer).
30. Here  as  well  as  elsewhere  in  this  paper,  I  am  using  this  word  in  the  sense  in  which
Wittgenstein and, following him, Cavell tend to use it.
31. Referring to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, Sabina Lovibond in Realism and Imagination in
Ethics suggests: “The sickness which that philosophy sets out to treat (the ‘bewitchment of our
intelligence by means of language’ [PI 1,  #109]) has its origins,  he implies,  in the incomplete
acceptance of our embodied condition, and in our failure to acknowledge the significance of that
condition for the reflective undersanding of such topics as meaning and rationality” (Lovibond
1983:  206),  also  of  course such  topics  as  action  and  time.  Our  incomplete  acceptance  of  our
embodied condition encompasses a failure to acknowledge that condition as temporal, without
qualification.
ABSTRACTS
The characteristic form of human action is an extemporaneous performance or improvisational
exertion. An ordinary conversation (what C. S. Peirce calls “a wonderfully perfect kind of sign-
functioning” [EP 2: 391]) provides us with an extremely useful model for understanding other
forms  of  “unrehearsed  intellectual  adventure”  (Oakeshott  1991:  490),  not  least  of  all  jazz
improvisation. But since our inquiry into this range of considerations turns on appealing to our
experience as improvisational actors in the overlapping situations of everyday life, this appeal
itself needs to be considered. Accordingly, the appeal to experience is here interrogated with the
aid of what pragmatists but also perfectionists such as Stanley Cavell say about it. What Cavell
asserts regarding checking one’s experience, as a way of rendering it trustworthy, is of the utmost
critical  importance for the present inquiry.  After exploring what is  entailed by an appeal  to
experience, when conjoined to what Cavell identifies as the task of checking one’s experience,
the author turns to our quotidian experience as improvisational actors and, ultimately, to the
rather  singular  achievements  of  jazz  improvisers.  In  doing  so,  he  hopes  to  illuminate  the
inherently creative dimension of human action, wherever it unfolds.
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